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SUMMARY 
Modern air defense systems can be viewed as large interacting networks 
of man-machine configurations of sensors, communication links, operations 
centers, launchers and missiles. The general objective of this research was 
to investigate the application of Industrial and Systems Engineering method-
ologies normally used in quality control and network analysis to the investi-
gation of graceful degredation in air defense systems whose components have 
been developed piece-meal. 
This report includes a brief review of approaches to weapons systems 
modeling, a review of network methodologies, and the development of a model 
of a battalion level air defense network of one operation center and four 
fire units. Based on this model, sample cases are investigated using hypo-
thetilal data and analytical evaluations to the Minimum Cost Flow Algorithm 
to illustrate the effects of graceful degradation. 
Work under this task was originally planned to include more fire units, 
adjacent operations centers, and a computerized simulation using MICOM data. 
When data was not furnished by the sponsor in the summer of 1981, a no-cost 
one year extension was proposed in September 1981. This request was turned 
down, and the research reported here reflects work during the period December 
1980 through 30 September 1981. 
Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. 	Description of the Problem 
Modern weapon systems can be viewed as large interacting networks of man-
machine configurations of sensors, communication links, operations centers, 
launchers, and missiles. The level of automation, or dependence on computer 
driven processes in lieu of human decision is highest for air defense systems, 
and lowest for forward area infantry systems. Consequently, air defense sys- 
tems require a higher level of technical integration for effective field 
operations than infantry or field artillery. However, the military research 
and development and procurement system is geared toward piecemeal develop- 
ment of new components across the whole spectrum of weapon systems, and 
doe4h i t take into account the unique requirements of air defense systems 
for integrating successive generation of new missiles, radars, computers, 
and communication components. 
Degredation denotes a reduction to a lower state of effectiveness due 
to normal failures of components due to reliability, availability, maintain-
ability, or enemy action. Graceful degredation implies a non-catastrophic 
reduction in system effectiveness by linking alternative components in dif-
ferent combinations of modal connections still capable of field operations. 
Although a number of analytical tools have been developed for the application 
of graceful degredation principles to the design of communcation networks 
and airborne avionics systems, and more recently to distributed data proces-
sing systems (1) relatively little research has been conducted on their use 
in the design of air defense weapon systems. 
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B. Project Objective  
The general objective of this research is to investigate the applica- 
tion of Industrial and Systems Engineering methodologies normally used in 
quality control and network analysis to the investigation of graceful degre-
dation in air defense systems whose components have been developed piece-meal. 
C. Scope  
This report includes a brief review of approaches to weapon systems 
modeling, a review of network methodologies, and the development of a model 
of a battalion level air defense network of one operations center and four 
fire units. Sample cases with hypothetical data and an analytical solution 
to the Minimum Cost Flow Algorithm have been solved to illustrate the effects 
of graceful degredation. Work under this task was originally planned to in-
clud, more fire units, adjacent operation centers, and a computerized simu-
lation run using MICOM data. When data was not furnished by the sponsor in 
the summer of 1981, a no-cost one year extension was proposed in September 
1981. This request was turned down, and the research reported here reflects 
work during the period December 1980 through 30 September 1981. 
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Chapter II 
SYSTEMS MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
Systems modeling and analysis is a relatively new discipline and many 
of its early applications were military systems. It has since been applied 
to a wide spectrum of activities, such as hospitals, banks, assembly lines, 
etc. Systems modeling and analysis is now the primary approach to solving 
problems involving large, complex systems. Parallel development of sophisti-
cated computers and specialized languages, such as GPSS, COBOL, GASP, etc., 
facilitated the solution of many problems that would otherwise have been 
mathematically forbidding. Even without computers, the systems approach 
presents a way of tackling problems that would otherwise be unsolvable for 
all practical purposes. Unfortunately, definition of the components of the 
system and their interrelationship is frequently a complex problem itself. 
A solution to an improperly defined or oversimplified problem is of no 
practical value. The key is to accurately model the system so it reflects 
the true state of nature. Some systems can be simply analyzed with straight-
forward operations research techniques; while other systems may not be 
readily recognized as problems and may require some "massaging" before being 
tackled with OR solution techniques. Because OR techniques are useful in 
almost all cases, properly defining the system using OR terminology is of 
prime importance. Regardless of the problem's simplicity or complexity, when 
properly applied, OR techniques can provide valuable information about system 
performance characteristics without actual operation of the system. 
The value of this approach is quite obvious. Monetary savings can be 
considered when OR techniques are used instead of actual system testing. 
System configurations can be varied and measurements taken without any com-
ponent of the system actually moving. Possible additions or deletions to the 
system can be tested; and equipment that does not currently exist can be 
evaluated and its impact on system performance ascertained. Performance 
characteristics can be altered, the system reconfigured, and many other 
permutations can be tested in a matter of seconds, rather than months or 
years. The benefits are numerous; and, in a climate of increased cost 
consciousness, cost efficiency is perhaps the most significant benefit. 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, the cornerstone of systems 
analysis, either by computer simulations or analytical methods is the sys-
tem model developed in the problem definition phase. The concept of a 
"weapon system" had its genesis in the World War II era, and many attempts 
were made in the 1950's and 1960's to develop standard models and defini-
tions. The Weapon System Communication (WESCOM) Project at the University 
of Pennsylvania in the mid 1950's is an example of one of the early multi- 
disciplinary attempts directed at the semantical and taxanomical problems 
related to weapon system modeling, particularly for air defense systems (2). 
WESCOM developed a glossary of terms classifying weapons systems by modes 
of operation. That is, either a weapons system operated independently or it 
operated under coordinated conditions, either centralized or cooperative. 
Subsequent doctrinal considerations have changed the terminology to indepen-
dent/autonomous operation, centralized control, and decentralized control. 
WESCON was also one of the first attempts and functional breakdowns of sub-
systems and components (3). In the same time frame a number of individual 
investigations attempted to complement the large scale multidisciplinary 
effort as exemplified in WESCOM by developing a Weapon System Philosophy (4), 
and at least 20 different definitions appeared in the literature related to 
defense research and development. 
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One of the last attempts at developing a generalized weapons system 
model was made by the Army staff in 1969 in "Force Structure Planning - 
Determination of Micro-Weapon Systems." (5) This effort was directed towards 
defining an "Elemental Destructive Weapon System" which could be utilized 
for the comparative analysis of alternative technologies against a hierarchy 
of enemy targets. It addressed the problem of the basic functional micro-
structure of weapon systems, i.e. sensing, communications, movement, and 
delivery of warheads. The intended application would range from the individ-
ual soldier, to a whole air defense battery, and would offer a framework 
for an optimum cost/effective methodology for the design of organizational 
structures, particularly at the battalion and bigrade level. The basic sym-
bology and an illustration of its application to modeling air defense systems 
is shown in Appendix A. 
By the 1970's efforts at developing general purpose models of standard 
definition, and common functional structures of "weapon systems" for use 
with computer simulations, had almost ceased. Today there is no consensus, 
or general agreement with the Department of Defense on standard definitions 
or models. Consequently this research has been oriented towards the appli- 
cation of standard Industrial and Systems Engineering models and methodologies 
currently employed in quality control and network analysis. 
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Chapter III 
Modeling Systems as Networks 
The concept of modeling systems as networks has recently received much 
attention. Systems that can be modeled as networks possess certain proper-
ties which make them particularly attractive both to understanding and solu-
tion. The study of network flow problems has produced a variety of solution 
techniques and the development of numerous efficient algorithms with wide 
application (6)- 
In its simplest form, a network flow problem is a connecting of nodes 
with a system of links over which information, materials, or commodities are 
transmitted. It is obvious that all air defense system configurations, from 
the NORAD system to a Redeye section, meet that basic network definition. An 
air tefense system can be modeled as a network and can be studied as a net-
work flow problem. It is, therefore, constructive to survey some of the more 
useful solution techniques and to discuss how they might be applied in the 
context of an air defense network. 
One of the most common network problems encountered is that of a simple 
assignment problem. A standard (M - jobs and M - machines) or a nonstandard 
(M - machines and N - jobs where M N) assignment problem has been efficiently 
solved using the transportation algorithm described in many texts, as well as 
Vogel's approximation techniques. The problem can be quickly solved with 
computers and feasible solutions can be easily computed by hand. 
It is possible to pattern an air defense network as an assignment prob- 
lem by considering hostile aircraft as jobs and air defense launchers as 
machines. A measure of effectiveness, combining factors such as reliability, 
kill-probability, site location, and other parameters, can be used as a 
substitute for costs in the original assignment problem. Although assignment 
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algorithms are possible solution techniques and are easily adaptable to subse-
quent analysis under degraded conditions, the dynamic nature of the aircraft/ 
launcher problem constrains their value in a practical sense. 
A related specialized form for networks is the transportation problem. 
In its most general application, a transportation problem involves shipping 
commodities from sources to sinks. The main considerations are least-cost 
and least-time problems. As with other common network problems, algorithms 
have been developed to efficiently solve transportation problems. The algo- 
rithms include the MODI (modified distribution) method and the Northwest 
Corner Method. With little difficulty, it can be seen that a model of an 
air defense system can be constructed as a transportation problem; and the 
model can then be solved using well-known algorithms. As with an assignment-
type modeling format, a transportation model for an air defense network has 
serious operational shortcomings which limit its usefulness. 
A special form of the transportation problem, the transshipment problem, 
possesses a structure which has an intuitive appeal when related to an air 
defense network. When transshipment nodes are viewed as control centers 
(ADCCP/TOC/SOC, etc.), an air defense network resembles a transshipment 
structure. Algorithms have been developed to solve the transshipment problem 
in an indirect manner by decomposing the transshipment problem into a series 
of transportation problems. A direct method, the minimal cost network flow 
method, has also been developed and can be efficiently applied to solve the 
transshipment problem. Again, the dynamic nature of the problem and parameter 
calculation present certain difficulties in determining a solution, but the 
structure of the problem enables degraded conditions to be efficiently solved. 
A related area of network analysis is the construction of a minimum 
spanning tree (i.e., the connecting of all nodes in a tree at minimal cost). 
8 
An important characteristic is that any conclusion drawn about a minimum 
spanning tree (MST) is equally applicable to a maximum spanning tree. When 
the requirement of total information flow in a control system, such as an 
air defense network, is considered, the MST seems quite applicable. Kruskal 
and Dykstra have both studied the MST problem and proposed algorithms to 
solve it. These algorithms are easily computerized and are quite efficient. 
When modified so they are rooted at a given node, the MST structure is appli- 
cable to an air defense network under optimal conditions and increasingly 
degraded conditions. The MST algorithm, in either form, could be used to 
reconstruct the network as a node or arc is destroyed, but it does not give 
any indication of how targets should be allocated, so its usage is limited. 
By modifying arc costs and equating costs to some function weighted on such 
parameters as system reliability, target speed, proximity to defended area, 
etc., the MST algorithm has possible, although limited, application to the 
air defense problem. 
Other solution techniques for specialized classes of networks have been 
proposed and proven to be viable in the solution of these problems. As with 
previously cited examples, an air defense network can be modeled to fit 
practically any network class; and, by imaginatively defining constraints and 
parameters, the appropriate algorithm can be used to obtain a solution, if 
one exists. Some of these classes of problems are the shortest path problem, 
multicommodity network flows, and minimum cost flow. Bradley provides an 
excellent survey of the research done and algorithms proposed to solve the 
above-mentioned problems. 
Generally, network analysis is valuable in solving air defense problems. 
It has the advantages of being computationally efficient and more intuitive 
to the layman; and cost efficient solution techniques are readily available. 
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As previously cited, however, there are drawbacks to network analysis with 
reference to air defense systems. 
Mallon researched and proposed a network flow approach to a military 
related problem in 1974 (7). The problem he considered was to develop a method 
for controlling telephone communication networks during periods when demand 
exceeds capacity. Mallon attempted to employ several techniques to solve 
this problem and described a procedure to configure a communications network. 
His chapter on network theoretics applies to the air defense problem, as well 
as it applies to the communication problem. Where Mallon was concerned with 
the routing of tactical communications, the air defense problem concerns the 
distribution of targets. Mallon's coverage of the problem of changing user 
requirements (i.e., network alteration) is directly comparable to the degraded 
air defense system problem. 
Fault tree analysis is another related area of analysis which can be used 
to gain insight into the underlying structure of an air defense system. Fault 
tree analysis, which is primarily a technique used in reliability analysis, 
would provide some understanding of subsystems' strengths, weaknesses, and 
critical components. Gordon Rankin studied fault tree analysis as applied 
to operational testing (8). He cites the numerous advantages and disadvan-
tages of the method and concludes that despite its shortcomings, fault tree 
analysis is an excellent way of gaining a greater understanding of the sys-
tem. Rankin recommends areas for future research; and to his list, air de-




The previous discussion highlighted some of the background research 
accomplished in the areas of system definition and representative models. 
The development of operations research techniques and their application to 
military systems has been an evolutionary process, sometimes rapid, other 
times slow, but constantly changing and evolving. It is not the purpose 
of this paper to add to the techniques available, but rather to show an 
application of operations research techniques to a particular problem. The 
problem to be addressed is to model a basic air defense system and to demon-
strate the systems approach to this problem. 
The specific problem to be addressed is the ability of a basic air 
defetse system to detect, allocate, engage, and destroy hostile aircraft. 
A basic air defense system is considered to be a battalion size unit, which 
includes a centralized control element and a number of subordinate fire units. 
In particular, the system to be modeled is comprised of the AN/TSQ-73 Missile 
Minder, a command and control system for surface to air missiles and four sub- 
ordinate fire units or batteries, either Hawk or Nike Hercules. Figure 1 
shows typical operational interfaces. 
It is important to note that as stated before, there are many ways to 
model the basic air defense system as defined. The model utilized herein 
is to view the system as a network, composed of nodes and interconnecting 
arcs. In particular, the system can be modeled as a variation of a trans- 
shipment problem. This can be done so long as each battery is considered as 
being able to engage only those targets allocated to it, without the capacity 
to acquire and engage targets independently of the AN/TSQ-73. In the interest 
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operations (i.e., one type of aircraft with identical flight characteristics) 
and not a multicommodity problem. The multicommodity problem can be solved 
with multicommodity network algorithms, but such a solution although a more 
complex problem, is merely an extension of the application demonstration herein. 
Therefore, for the purposes of illustration, a single commodity network is 
sufficient. 
The basic air defense system modeled as a transshipment problem would 
be as shown in Figure 2: 
TARGETS 
FIGURE 2: Basic Air Defense System Modeled as a Transshipment Problem 
If this air defense system were to operate as part of a larger organi-
zation, the battalion AN/TSQ-73 would operate subordinate to a Group or 
Society Air Defense Operations Center. In addition, adjacent battalions 
would have the ability to provide command and control for this air defense 
system's fire units should its AN/TSQ-73 become non-operational/destroyed. 
As shown, the problem, even for a basic air defense system, is complex 
and, when the possible connecting links with higher and adjacent AN/TSQ-73's 
are included (not shown in Fig. 2 for simplicity), the problem becomes even 
more formidable. With current computer resources and solution algorithms 
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available, solutions to problems of this magnitude are easily attainable 
and even very complex systems are solvable, although not with a great deal 
of difficulty. 
Having specified the modeling technique to be used, the costs and capaci-
ties of the arcs in the network must be defined. The capacities can be de-
scribed in a functional form to represent the variables which determine the 
system's performance and thereby enable the system to be evaluated under a 
variety of conditions. 
These functional relatinships can be derived using a number of techniques 
available to the researcher. An obvious and very powerful technique is 
multiple linear regression. Another means available is purely analytical 
curve fitting, seeing what relationships are required to have the data fit 
the results. In any event, the functional form developed can be as simple 
or complex as the modeler desires. 
In this problem the arc capacities must be expressed as two separate 
functional relationships. One function defines the relationship between 
targets and the AN/TSQ-73; while the other characterizes the interrelation-
ship of the AN/TSQ-73, fire units and targets. 
There are many factors which determine the functional relationship be-
tween the AN/TSQ-73 and target aircraft. Some of the more obvious are the 
aircraft's speed, altitude, electronic warefare capability, raid size, etc. 
Other factors such as radar masking, acquisition range, target resolution, 
etc. are also factors in determining the ability of the AN/TSQ-73 to detect, 
identify and allocate targets to the fire units. Of these parameters, some 
are more easily quantified than others. Some of these parameters must be 
given subjective weightings based upon experience. Irregardless of the 
values assigned to the parameters, each factor present in the derived 
functional relationship will have an impact on system performance. 
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In this model, the only concern is - the allocation of targets to the 
fire units, so it is assumed that either all targets are detected, that is 
the AN/TSQ-73 is fully operational, or no targets are detected, the AN/TSQ-73 
is non-operational/destroyed. If no targets are detected, there is no flow 
in the network and in effect no problem. If all targets are detected, the 
arc capacities represent the relationship between the AN/TSQ-73 and the fire 
units. It is assumed that with all targets detected, capacity on the arcs 
from target to AN/TSQ-73 is infinite and cost is 1. 
The ability of the fire units to successfully engage allocated targets 
is a function of many variables. Some of these variables are totally depen-
dent upon the communications links between the AN/TSQ-73 and the fire units, 
while others are functions of the fire units' abilities to acquire, track and 
engage allocated targets. 
Two major factors which affect the capacity of the arc from the AN/TSQ-73 
to the fire unit are the communications/data link reliability and fire unit 
system availability. The same factors which impact on AN/TSQ-73 capability 
to detect and identify targets are primary considerations in a fire unit's 
ability to destroy allocated aircraft. 
To completely describe the performance of a system would require the in- 
clusion of all possible factors in the functional relationship. However, 
this is not necessarily desireable or required. For the purposes of illus- 




U.. = Upper bound arc capacity from node i to node j 
t = crew standard engagement time (min.) 
a = target altitude (in 1,000 ft.) 
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v = target velocity (in knots) 
m = missiles available (on launches) 
r = engagement range (in 10k yds) 
W' = electronic warfare capacity of target minus counter-electronic 
warfare capacity of fire unit (non-negative integer 0, 1, 2, 3) 
Assuming for illustration the cost function to be dependent only upon 
probabilities that a target will not be successfully engaged, the following 
cost function is presented as a type functional relationship: 
Cij 	(Po  xPm  xPc ) -1 
C.. = cost of arc from node i to node j 
Po = probability a fire unit is operational 
% 
P
m = probability a target engaged will be destroyed 
P
c 
= probability communications and software interfaces are operational 
(probability a target allocation from AN/TSQ-73 is correctly re-
ceived at the proper fire unit. 
Utilizing the hypothetical functional relationships stated, it is possible 
to generate data of sample cases of gracefully degrading systems to be analyzed. 
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To determine the utility and practicality of the model, it must be 
tested under varying conditions of successive degradation to insure its re- 
sults are reasonable and usable. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to enter into the model validation procedure, it is worthwhile to pre- 
sent some sample cases to illustrate the manner in which the model would 
function and to extend these sample results into some recommendations and 
conclusions. 
The model, as stated previously, is four fire units under the opera-
tional control of an AN/TSQ-73 Missile Minder System (see Fig. 3). Using' 
the hypothetical functional relationships specified in Chapter IV for "costs" 
and :;capacities," arc costs and arc capacities can be calculated for each 
arc of the air defense network. The solution algorithm employed is the 
Minimum Cost Flow Algorithm, but any of many other techniques such as the 
Out-of-Kilter Algorithm are equally valid approaches to the problem. 
In conducting the sample tests of the model, for purposes of illustration, 
all target information will remain constant, with the only changes being the 
changing parameters of fire unit capability and availability, to reflect the 
successive graceful degradation of the system being modeled. 
To interpret the results for each set of conditions, the network cost, 
as computed by the Minimum Cost Flow Algorithm, is the cost incurred by the 
air defense system to engage, with a high probability of success, the total 
aircraft allocated by the AN/TSQ-73 or the total capacity of the system, 
whichever is smaller. Given that the total engagement capacity of the sys-
tem is the sum of the capacities of the individual fire units in the system, 
when the total raid size is greater than the total capacity of the system, 
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there will be penetration of the air defense system, unless another system 
is available to engage these targets. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to use as a measure of the system's effect-
iveness the total cost incurred to engage the hostile aircraft and the number 
of aircraft which were not engaged. Using these two parameters, one could 
determine the system's effectiveness by comparing the cost and number of 
penetrators to a predetermined fixed index, thereby gaining an appreciation 
of the effect of graceful degradation upon system effectiveness. 
In each of the cases presented, the target characteristics are held 
constant, as stated previously. These target characteristics are presented 
in Appendix B, Table 1. The initial system characteristics are presented 
in Appendix A, Table 2. As these parameters are changed due to system degra- 
dation in the various cases considered, only those parameters which are 
changed will be listed. Those parameters not specifically stated for the 
individual cases are assumed to be the initial system characteristics. The 
network representations of these various cases are presented as appendices 
to this paper. 
In Case 1, (see Appendix C) the system is presented as a fully opera- 
tional system, with the only constraints on the system capability being 
those imposed by the initial system characteristics and target characteris- 
tics. Solving this system as a maximum flow, minimum cost network yields the 
solution as shown in Appendix B. 
In case 2 (see Appendix D), the system has been degraded by decreasing 
the number of available missiles at Battery A from 18 to 11. Even with just 
this slight degradatin in system capabilities, there has been a substantial 
change in overall system effectiveness, resulting in a failure to engage 3 
aircraft. 
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In Case 3 (see Appendix E), the communications from Battery B to the 
AN/TSQ-73 is out of action, while Battery A is still degraded by having only 
11 missiles available. Here, the system again has been reduced in efficiency 
by having 3 aircraft penetrate without being engaged and because of the re-
quirement to allocate targets to Battery B by way of Battery A, the cost has 
increased significantly. This cost is occasioned by the additional cost of 
5 units per target for each allocation to Battery B. 
In Case 4 (see Appendix F), the system is further degraded by having 
Battery B become non-operational. This results in system effectiveness 
being further reduced as 14 aircraft are now able to penetrate the defended 
area without being engaged. 
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Chapter VI 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
From the costs of engagements and the numbers of aircarft which gene- 
" trate the defended area without being engaged for each of the cases presented, 
it is easily seen that as system capabilities are degraded, these costs in- 
crease. In addition, as system capabilities are degraded, system effect-
iveness measured against aircraft engaged also decreases. In a mode as 
simple as this where the effects of specified parameters can be controlled, 
it becomes immediately evident the impact each level of degradation has 
upon system capabilities. From this, one can recognize the value of utilizing 
the techniques of operations research, systems analysis to examine real life 
systems in part and as a whole to gain a greater appreciation of how the 
part of the system act and interact to create the system as it operates. 
In this context, it can be concluded that operations research tech-
niques can be successfully employed to analyze an air defense system and that 
from such an analysis significant information can be obtained. This infor- 
mation can then be utilized to give the commander on the ground a more de-
tailed impact of the effects of graceful degradation upon his system effect-
iveness. In addition, information of this type is extremely valuable to the 
systems designer in that it enables him to focus more clearly upon the criti-
cal items of the system to ensure improved system availability through greater 
reliability, surviveability and redundancy. 
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APPENDIX A 
Development of Micro-Weapon System Structure 
I. Basic Functions of Weapon Systems  
a. In order to develop a comparison between elementary or micro-
weapon systems, it is useful to consider certain basic functions with a 
commonality of functions across the several families of weapon systems. A 
unit weapons systems is a set of inter-dependent related man and equipment 
elements capable of performing a combination of four elementary functions 
with the objective of delivering a warhead and destroying a specified 
target array. 
b. The functions which are common, and their definitions, are: 
(1) SENSING. A systems has the ability to sense; to judge, distinguish, 
discriminate, or estimate external conditions of the target. 
(2) COMMUNICATE. A system has the ability to communicate; to receive, 
pass along, transmit, or make known information pertinent to the target. 
(3) MOVE. A system has the ability to move; to place itself in a 
position of advantage, change place or position, and respond to movements 
of the target. 
(4) LAUNCH. A system must be able to launch/shoot; to send forth 
or discharge a missile, projectile, warhead, or other means intended to 
accomplish the objective relative to the target. 
II. Case for Employment of Weapon Systems  
It is convenient to discuss the micro-weapon system in relation to its 
movement or position and the relative movement or positions of the target. 
There are four cases of relativity between the micro-weapon systems and the 
target array. 
System Target  
Fixed 	 Fixed 
Fixed 	 Moving 
Moving 	 Fixed 













	 Information flow 
	 Logistics support 
• Command and control 
Micro-Weapon 
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III. Elemental Micro-Weapon Structures  
Using the fundamental functions and the basic cases outlined, it is 
a simple matter to synthesize the basic micro-weapon structure. One way 
of relating the basic functions is as follows. 
SOLDIER AND WEAPON 
Output 











System and Target Characteristics 
TABLE 1: 	Target Characteristics 
1. Raid Size: 	40 
2. Target Altitude: 	30,000 ft. 
3. Target Speed: 	400 knots 
4. Electronic Warfare Capability: 	0 
TABLE 2: 	System Characteristics 





A 	 18 	200,000 yds 	2.1 min .80 .90 .80 
B 	 15 	150,000 yds 	1.6 min .75 .85 .85 
C , 	 24 	120,000 yds 	2. 	min .85 .80 .75 
D 	 12 	90,000 yds 	1.1 min .70 .80 .65 
= .20 





C.. = cost on arc 
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APPENDIX C 
CASE 1; No System Degradation 
COST OF ENGAGEMENT: 118.28 units 




CASE 2; Battery A Degraded (Only 11 Missiles Ready) 
(Cif ,u..) 13 
C
ij 
= cost on arc 
   
COST OF ENGAGEMENT: 112.08 units -I- 3 aircraft not engaged 
(C.. 	. ) 3.3 
C.. = cost on arc 




CASE 3; Battery A Degraded (Only 11 Missiles Ready), Battery B Degraded 
(Communications Lost to AN/TSQ-73) 




Cij = cost on arc 
ujj = capacity on arc 
TSQ 




CASE 4; Battery A Degraded (Only 11 Missiles Ready), Battery B Out of Action 
COST OF ENGAGEMENT: 801.73 units + 14 aircraft not engaged 
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